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I. INTRODUCTION
It has now been almost a century since the people of the
State of Washington ratified America's forty-third bill of rights.'
As might be expected of the authors of a document that had
been drafted and redrafted many times by different people in
different ages, the framers of the Washington Declaration of
Rights (the "Declaration") borrowed heavily from earlier ver-
sions, while incorporating new ideas and provisions that they
considered appropriate to the peculiar conditions, history, and
philosophy of their Territory and its people.
For a variety of reasons, however, the charter that was
intended as the primary protector of the fundamental rights of
Washingtonians' was largely ignored by subsequent generations
* Portions of this article were presented on August 29, 1983, at the Annual Fall
Judicial Conference in Vancouver, Washington, and on March 9, 1984, at the National
Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law in Williamsburg, Virginia.
** Justice, Washington Supreme Court. B.S. 1952, University of Washington; LL.B.
1954, University of Washington.
The author wishes to thank his law clerk, Mark Eibert, for his initial and continuing
assistance in shaping and preparing this article, and his intern, Lourene Miovski, for her
effective help. Special thanks go to administrative assistant Virginia Murry, for her
efforts in preparing this article, and to former associate Justice Charles Horowitz, whose
encouragement is always present.
1. The Washington Constitution became effective on Washington's admission as the
forty-second state of the Union on November 11, 1889. Thus, one federal and forty-one
state bills of rights were in effect at the time the Washington Declaration of Rights came
into force. Depending on how one defines such terms as "constitution," "bill of rights,"
and "America," however, the Washington Declaration of Rights may have had approxi-
mately 130 American predecessors. For instance, by 1889 Georgia had adopted seven
different constitutions, one of which was in effect from 1861 to 1865 and reflected Geor-
gia's transfer of allegiance to the Confederate States of America. 2 COLUMBIA U. CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE (1983) (Notes preceding the Geor-
gia Constitution).
2. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 H~Av. L. REv. 489, 501-02 (1977); Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin
Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 531, 532-33
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of lawyers, judges, and scholars who assumed erroneously that
the attitudes, beliefs, and intentions of the framers of the 1889
Washington Declaration were identical to those of the drafters
of one of the other bills of rights a full century earlier on the
other side of the continent. In recent years, this assumption has
been questioned more frequently by lawyers and judges search-
ing for the scope the founders of our state intended to give to
fundamental individual freedoms. Increasingly, Washington
courts are being asked to consider our Declaration as an inde-
pendent and effective source of protection for individual rights,
including some rights not recognized or protected by the United
States Supreme Court, and to give our state constitution a truly
independent interpretation. No matter how sympathetic they
may be to such requests, lawyers and judges face at least three
major problems in making a truly independent interpretation of
a state constitutional provision.
First, they must justify departing from precedents laid
down by the United States Supreme Court, a step which makes
many people understandably uncomfortable until the differing
histories of the federal and state acts are understood.
Second, they must decide when and how to approach a state
constitutional problem. Typical questions include whether the
state or federal constitution should be raised or considered first;
whether and how a state constitutional provision should be com-
pared with the comparable federal provision, if any; how to
weigh federal court precedents and state court dicta; how to
avoid the danger of federal review and reversal of decisions that
rest on independent state constitutional grounds; and, how to
develop an independent framework for analyzing the state Dec-
laration of Rights.
Finally, they must decide how to analyze state constitu-
tional provisions with few or no Washington Supreme Court
precedents for guidance. Although most judges are familiar with
the usual forms of textual analysis, many are unaccustomed to
making the necessary in-depth inquiry into the intent of the
people who wrote and ratified the Declaration, and few know
what resources are available to aid them in discovering such
intent.t Furthermore, trial judges are generally reluctant to base
(1979).
t [EDITOR's NorE: For a highly informative and in-depth treatment of researching
state legislative history, see the Comment entitled "Legislative History in Washington"
within this issue.]
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their decisions even in part on their analysis of contemporary
values and conditions, an analysis that is uniquely necessary to
the continued existence and vitality of a modern constitution.
II. GROUNDS FOR INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF THE
WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that state courts may interpret state constitutions to be more
protective of individual rights than the United States Constitu-
tion.8 The Washington Supreme Court has expressly accepted
this responsibility on a number of occasions.4 In Alderwood
Associates v. Washington Environmental Council,5 for example,
the Washington Supreme Court found a state constitutional
right to solicit initiative signatures in privately-owned shopping
centers, and explained this departure from federal constitutional
precedent as follows:
State courts are obliged to determine the scope of their
state constitutions due to the structure of our government.
3. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4 (1975). See generally Brennan, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817, - P.2d _, - (1984)
(holding that WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, unlike the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution, prohibits a police officer's warrantless entry into the residence of a
person he has just arrested for a misdemeanor unless the officer possesses specific
articulable facts demonstrating a threat to the officer's safety, the possibility that the
evidence of the crime for which the person was arrested will be destroyed, or a strong
likelihood of escape); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (holding
that WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, unlike the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, limits warrantless searches incident to arrest to areas within the arrested
person's immediate control and only for the purpose of removing weapons or preventing
the destruction of evidence for which the arrest is made); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92,
108, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070 (1982) (holding that, in spite of federal constitutional law to the
contrary, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 requires exclusion of evidence obtained by arresting a
citizen for refusing to comply with an unconstitutional stop-and-identify statute); Alder-
wood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108, 112-13
(1981) (holding that, unlike the first amendment to the United States Constitution,
WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 5 protects the exercise of certain free speech rights in privately
owned shopping centers); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199, 1204
(1980) (recognizing a right to "automatic standing" to contest illegal searches and
seizures under WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 in cases where such standing would be absent
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution); State v. Fain, 94 Wash.
2d 387, 392, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) (holding that, unlike the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution, WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 14 prohibits as unconstitutionally
cruel the sentencing of a "habitual offender" to life imprisonment for three minor
felonies).
5. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
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In the compound republic of America, the power surren-
dered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments; and then the portion allocated to each sub-
divided among distinct and separate departments. Hence
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other, at the same
time each will be controlled by itself.
When a state court neglects its duty to evaluate and apply its
state constitution, it deprives the people of their "double
security." It also removes from the people the ability to try
"novel social and economic experiments"-which is another
important justification for the federal system ...
We have often independently evaluated our state constitu-
tion and have concluded that it should be applied to confer
greater civil liberties than its federal counterpart when the rea-
soning and evidence indicate such was intended and is
necessary .... 6
There are many other compelling reasons, of course, for
state courts to interpret state constitutional provisions indepen-
dently from the corresponding provisions, if any, of the United
States Constitution, even where the two provisions contain iden-
tical language.
A. Differences between the state and federal constitutions
Various courts and commentators have noted the most cru-
cial differences between the federal and state constitutions.7 For
instance, the Washington Supreme Court has often observed
that the United States Constitution is a grant of limited power,
authorizing the federal government to exercise only those consti-
tutionally enumerated powers expressly delegated to it by the
states.8 The state constitutions, on the other hand, serve as limi-
tations on the otherwise plenary power of state governments to
do anything not expressly forbidden by the state constitutions or
6. Id. at 237-38, 635 P.2d at 113 (citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Douglas, State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of
Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1123, 1144-45 (1978); Howard, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 935, 939-40 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Fain v. Chapman, 89 Wash. 2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1977) (citing
four Washington cases); Union High School Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers of Union High
School, 26 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 172 P.2d 591, 594 (1946).
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federal law. Consequently, state constitutions are typically
much longer and more detailed than the federal Constitution,
and contain much more specific provisions for the regulation of
state governmental conduct.
In addition, the Washington Constitution is a more "politi-
cal" document than its federal counterpart. The relative ease
with which it can be amended, combined with its much more
recent authorship, make our state constitution much more
reflective of current local values than the federal charter and
much more responsive to changes in those values.1"
Furthermore, state constitutions often protect individual
rights that are nowhere explicitly recognized in the United
States Constitution. For instance, article 1, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution provides express constitutional protec-
tion for certain privacy rights of Washington citizens.1 Article 9,
section 1 creates a right of all Washington children to be amply
provided with a public education."s Article 1, section 24 guaran-
tees an individual right to bear arms, in contrast to the federal
Constitution's collective right to bear arms for purposes of main-
taining a well-regulated state militia.'3
B. Differences between the state and federal courts
There are also significant differences between the federal
and Washington judiciaries. 4 For instance, Washington judges
are elected, and are subject to periodic reelection, while federal
judges are appointed for life. On the one hand, this gives federal
judges potentially more freedom to interpret the national Con-
9. Id.
10. See Howard, supra note 7, at 938-39.
11. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
12. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 declares that "[ift is the paramount duty of the state
to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its bor-
ders .. " That this duty creates a corresponding right of Washington children to be
educated was recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in Seattle School Dist. 1 v.
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 510-14, 585 P.2d 71, 90-93 (1978).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (holding
that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms was designed only to assure thecontinuation and effectiveness of state militias); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (purpose of the second amendment
was to preserve the effectiveness and to assure the continuation of the state militias);
Annot., 37 A.L.R. FED. 696, 706-07 (1978) (citing numerous cases on the federal constitu-
tional right to bear arms).
14. See Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HAv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271, 293-96 (1973).
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stitution in an "activist" manner, since they face less severe per-
sonal consequences if their decisions are greatly out of line with
popular notions of justice. On the other hand, while an activist
role may be personally riskier to an elected judge, it may also be
considered more democratically legitimate than activism by
unelected, politically unresponsive federal judges. Similarly, the
relative ease of amending state constitutions reduces the risk of
erroneous or politically unacceptable constitutional lawmaking
by state judges once it occurs.1 5
Superimposed upon these differences are some related con-
straints on the United States Supreme Court's ability to broadly
interpret the United States Bill of Rights. For instance, the
United States Supreme Court establishes rules that must be
practical and accepted in all areas of the nation, forcing the
Court to choose the lowest common denominator of individual
rights. 16 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court must be
careful to respect the principles of federalism, one of which
requires that the states be left free to try a broad range of social,
political, and legal experiments.17 Neither of these constraints
applies to state judges in interpreting state constitutions.
Many of the factors discussed above suggest that state
judges have more freedom than federal judges to interpret their
constitutions and to provide a greater degree of protection to
individual rights than is possible under the United States
Constitution.
C. Early constitutional history
The early constitutional history of the United States leaves
no doubt that state bills of rights were never intended to be
dependent on or interpreted in light of the United States Bill of
Rights. In fact, most of the early states had declarations of
rights some years before the United States Constitution was
written, and the United States Bill of Rights was finally added
to meet demands for the same guarantees against the federal
government that people enjoyed against their state govern-
ments."8 Moreover, Washington, like the vast majority of rela-
15. Id. at 295-96.
16. Id. at 290-93.
17. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 242, 635 P.2d
108, 115 (1981), and sources cited therein.
18. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT'.
L. REV. 379, 381 (1980).
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tively newer states, copied much of its Declaration of Rights
from the constitutions of older states, rather than from the fed-
eral charter.' 9 It would be illogical to assume that a state consti-
tution that was written before the United States Constitution, or
a declaration of rights copied from such a state constitution at a
time when the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states,
was meant to be interpreted with reference to federal courts'
interpretations of the federal Constitution. In fact, "[t]he case
for uniformity of state constitutions (to be prepared by the Con-
tinental Congress) was debated extensively during the months
preceding independence and rejected in favor of recommenda-
tions that the respective states call conventions to form constitu-
tions satisfactory to themselves. Diversity was the only politi-
cally realistic answer. '2 0
It is by now commonplace to note that the state constitu-
tions were originally intended as the primary devices to protect
individual rights,' and the United States Bill of Rights was
intended as a secondary layer of protection against the power of
a weak central government with very limited powers. Perhaps
this is why state courts have often been the first to develop tech-
niques for protecting individual rights22 that the United States
Supreme Court later adopted and read into the United StatesConstitution. s
D. Intent of the framers of the Washington Constitution
When the delegates to the Washington Constitutional Con-
19. Id. See generally A. BEARDSLEY, Sources of the Washington Constitution as
Found in the Constitutions of the Several States, in CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON app. (1943).
20. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REV. 325, 334 (1973) (citing F. GREEN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860, at 52-54 (1930)) (foot-
notes omitted).
21. See supra note 2.
22. State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 166, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (exclusionary
rule); Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wisc. 249, 250-51 (1859) (right to counsel); Cole-
man v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 712-13, 98 P. 281, 281-82 (1908) (freedom of the press);
City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 608-09, 139 N.E. 86, 90-91 (1923) (freedom of
the press).
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (noting that 22 states had
acknowledged right to counsel was fundamental in obtaining a fair trial); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (citing state court rulings in support of the
"actual malice" standard for libel conviction). See also Blanchard, Filling in the Void;
Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow, in FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED
14-59 (B. Chamberlin & C. Brown ed. 1982).
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vention met in Olympia in 1889, their single overriding purpose
was probably to pave the way for the creation and admission
into the Union of a new and independent state, with all the
attributes of sovereignty enjoyed by American states in the late
nineteenth century.2 4 Among those attributes were an indepen-
dent constitution and an independent judiciary to interpret it.
Although the Civil War had already proved that states were not
sovereign in the ultimate sense, the phrase "state sovereignty"
did not yet have the hollow and anachronistic sound that many
attribute to it today. In 1889, the United States Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states, and federal law was not nearly so
predominant in the minds of lawyers and the general popula-
tion. It is extremely unlikely that the Washington framers, in
light of their central purpose in drafting our state constitution
and the then current view of states' rights, intended that the
federal constitution and courts should have any significant role
in interpreting or setting limits on the interpretation of Wash-
ington's constitution.
To say that the framer's single overriding purpose was to
pave the way for the admission of Washington into the Union is
not to deny that they had other purposes as well. One such pur-
pose was undoubtedly to protect the rights of Washingtonians,
and to secure for our people the same fundamental rights as
were enjoyed by the other citizens of the Union. Does this com-
mon general intent mean that the provisions of the Washington
Declaration were meant to mirror the corresponding provisions
of the United States Bill of Rights?2 5 Given the vast differences
in culture, politics, experience, education, and economic status
between the Northwestern framers of 1889 and the Eastern
framers of the United States Bill of Rights in 1789, and the
enormous differences of history and local conditions that sepa-
rated the two conventions, it is unlikely that the two documents
were written by men with much more in common than a shared
language and a similar, if vague, democratic philosophy. Thus,
even in the relatively few cases where the two documents used
identical language, the intent could be quite different. Although
it is difficult to say just what phrases like "cruel punishment,"
"freedom of conscience," or "due process" meant to a North-
western pioneer in 1889, it is probably safe to say that they did
24. Conversation with Justice Hans Linde, Oregon Supreme Court, July 1983.
25. For a slightly different version of this question, see Linde, supra note 20, at 333.
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not mean exactly the same thing that they meant to an aristo-
cratic Virginia plantation owner and slaveholder of 1789.26
In summary, there are many reasons why state courts
should avoid the temptation of assuming that the Washington
Declaration of Rights contains nothing more than a restatement
of the United States Bill of Rights. An independent interpreta-
tion and application of the Washington Constitution is not just
legitimate, historically mandated, and logically essential; it is, in
the words of the Washington Supreme Court, a "duty" that all
state courts owe to the people of Washington. 7
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND RECENT STATE COURT ACTIVITY
Washington is one of many states that rely on their own
constitutions to protect civil liberties. Since the recent retrench-
ment of the United States Supreme Court in this area,28 the
appellate courts of a majority of the states29 have interpreted
their state constitutions to provide greater protection for indi-
vidual rights than does the United States Constitution. A few
examples will help illustrate the nature and scope of these
decisions30
State constitutional provisions protecting freedom of speech
have been given substantial attention by state courts. For exam-
ple, shortly after the United States Supreme Court held that the
first amendment, with its explicit "state action" requirement,
does not protect the exercise of certain free speech rights in pri-
vate shopping centers,31 the state courts of Washington, Califor-
nia, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania
found that their own constitutions protected the exercise of free
26. Id.
27. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d
108, 113 (1981).
28. Peterkort, The Conflict Between State and Federal Constitutionally Guaran-
teed Rights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of State Constitutions, 32
CASE W. REs. 158, 160 & n.10 (1981).
29. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. This is not
intended to be a definitive list.
30. For a more complete survey of these cases up to the date of its publication, see
Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARv. L. Rv. 1324 (1982).
31. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972).
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speech rights even in the absence of "state action" as defined by
the United States Supreme Court.2
In balancing freedom of the press against the right to a fair
trial, the Washington Supreme Court in Federated Publications
v. Kurtz33 refused to follow an indistinguishable federal case3
because although it agreed with the result, it disagreed with the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court. Instead, the
court relied on article 1, section 10 of the Washington Constitu-
tion in holding that the press could be excluded from pretrial
hearings to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. 5
The supreme courts of Oregon and Arizona also refused to fol-
low federal precedent. Unlike Washington, however, they found
that their constitutions required news media access to all judi-
cial proceedings.3
Defendants' rights against unreasonable searches are also
greater under many state constitutions than under the federal
Constitution. In New York v. Belton3 7 and United States v.
Ross,3 8 for example, the United States Supreme Court held that
a police officer may make a valid warrantless search of every
part of a vehicle and all containers within it after arresting a
vehicle occupant, or upon probable cause. The Washington
Supreme Court held in State v. Ringer39 that although such
searches are not prohibited by the fourth amendment, they vio-
late article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which
32. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108
(1981) (finding a right to solicit initiative signatures in a private shopping center under
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d
341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (similar finding under CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2); Cologne v. Westfarms Ass'ns, 37 Conn. Supp. 90, 442 A.2d 471 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1982) (similar finding under CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J.
535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (finding a right to distribute pamphlets on a private university
campus under N.J. CONST. art. I, pars. 1, 6, 18, 20); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall,
118 Misc. 2d 841, 462 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (finding a right to distribute
leaflets in a private shopping mall under N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-10); Commonwealth v.
Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (finding a right to distribute leaflets on a private
college campus under PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, 20).
33. 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980).
34. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
35. 94 Wash. 2d at 58, 615 P.2d at 447-48.
36. State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 613 P.2d 23 (1980)
(preliminary hearing) (relying on OR. CONST. art. I, § 10); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.
Jennings, 101 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971) (juvenile hearing) (relying on ARiz. CONST.
art. II, §§ 6, 11).
37. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
38. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
39. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983).
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imposes much greater restrictions on warrantless searches."' The
New Hampshire and Rhode Island Constitutions have also been
interpreted to impose greater restrictions on warrantless auto-
mobile searches, while the Washington Constitution has recently
been held to place greater restrictions on warrantless "plain
view" searches of arrestees' homes.4 1
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v.
Robinson42 that a full body search incident to a lawful arrest is
reasonable per se under the fourth amendment. Washington and
Hawaii have rejected this approach under their own constitu-
tions and require full body searches to be reasonable and no
broader than necessary under the circumstances. 43 Alaska, Cali-
fornia, and Oregon also require that all searches be no broader
than necessary under the circumstances. 4
Many state courts have granted criminal defendants more
protection against the use of illegally obtained evidence under
their state constitutions than is currently available under the
federal Constitution. For instance, the United States Supreme
Court found a stop-and-identify statute unconstitutional in
Michigan v. DeFillippo,45 but held that the fourth amendment
did not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from an
arrest made in good-faith reliance on the invalid statute." The
Washington Supreme Court found a similar statute unconstitu-
tional under article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
in State v. White,47 but held that the state constitution required
the exclusion of the illegally-obtained evidence."
40. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
41. State v. Ball, No. 82-155 (N.H. Dec. 13, 1983) available prior to publication of
this article on LEXIS, States Library, N.H. file) (relying on N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX);
State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980) (relying on R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6); State v.
Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, - P.2d -, - (1984) (relying on WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 7).
42. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
43. State v. Hehman, 14 Wash. App. 770, 773, 544 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (relying on WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (relying on HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5).
44. Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, 198 (Alaska 1977) modified on other grounds,
573 P.2d 858 (1978) (relying on ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 544-45, 531 P.2d 1099, 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1975) (relying on CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 13); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 759-60, 653 P.2d 942, 952 (1982) (rely-
ing on OR. CONST. art. I, § 9).
45. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
46. Id. at 40.
47. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
48. Id. at 104, 640 P.2d at 1068.
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In United States v. Salvucci,49 the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant charged with a possessory offense
has no standing to suppress evidence obtained from an illegal
search of premises owned by another person, on the theory that
the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
other person's property. 0 The Washington Constitution has
been interpreted to allow a defendant charged with a possessory
offense automatic standing to challenge the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained from illegal searches without regard to who owns
the premises searched."'
The United States Supreme Court also held in Harris v.
New York 52 that a statement by a criminal defendant is admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes even though the police did not
adequately advise the defendant of his rights and obtain a
knowledgeable waiver before interrogation commenced.53 The
supreme courts of California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania have
subsequently held that such evidence is not admissible for
impeachment purposes under their respective state
constitutions.54
In Baldwin v. New York," the United States Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment does not require a jury
trial for petty offenses, which the Court defined as crimes that
are punishable by imprisonment for six months or less." Some
states, including Washington, Maine, Minnesota, and Oregon,
interpret their constitutions to guarantee the right to a jury trial
in all criminal prosecutions" regardless of the potential
punishment.
While the use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors
49. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
50. Id. at 95.
51. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980) (relying on
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7).
52. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
53. Id. at 225; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368
(1976) (relying on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 255-56, 492
P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (relying on HAWAII CONsT. art. I, § 4); Commonwealth v. Triplett,
462 Pa. 244, 249, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (1975) (relying on PA. CONST. art. I, § 9).
55. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
56. Id. at 73-74.
57. Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash. 2d 87, 653 P.2d 618 (1983) (relying on WASH. CONST.
art. I, §§ 21, 22); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (relying on ME. CONST. art. I, §
6); Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825 (1967) (relying on MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 6); Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977) (relying
on OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 16).
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because of their race was held not to violate the sixth amend-
ment in Swain v. Alabama,"8 Massachusetts and California have
found their constitutions to bar peremptory challenges6 9 on
racial grounds. Nor does the sixth amendment guarantee sus-
pects the assistance of counsel relating to preindictment identifi-
cation by crime victims.6 The California Supreme Court has
held, however, that the California Constitution requires access
to legal assistance during preindictment lineups."1
The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected
the argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se
as cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment.62  The California Supreme Court, however, found the
death penalty invalid as both cruel and unusual under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. es
Recidivist statutes which authorize life sentences for defen-
dants convicted of a few minor felonies were also found not to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the federal con-
stitution." However, the Washington Supreme Court has found
a similar statute to be unconstitutionally cruel under the Wash-
ington Constitution65
The United States Supreme Court has upheld congressional
restrictions on government payment for therapeutic abortions."
Many states have refused to allow constitutional abortion rights
to be so restricted. Courts in California, Connecticut, and Mas-
sachusetts, for example, have relied on their own constitutions,
to hold that state health insurance programs must subsidize
58. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
59. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979) (relying on MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (relying on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16).
60. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
61. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 102, 634 P.2d 927, 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr.
576, 585 (1981) (relying on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15).
62. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
63. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (1972). The people of California reacted to this decision by amending their
constitution (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27) to provide that the death penalty did not consti-
tute either cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of the California Constitu-
tion art. I, § 6.
64. Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
65. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 402, 617 P.2d 720, 728 (1980) (relying on WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 14).
66. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the "Hyde Amendment," Pub.
L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976)).
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both pregnancy and abortion expenses on equal terms." Colo-
rado, New Jersey, and Oregon also require state subsidization of
abortion expenses pursuant to their own constitutions."
The federal Constitution guarantees no right to an educa-
tion. 9 However, a number of states, including Washington, Cali-
fornia, and West Virginia, have recognized that education is a
fundamental right under their own constitutions.70 Furthermore,
numerous states, including Washington, California, Connecticut,
and Wyoming, have overturned systems linking educational
finances (and hence quality) to property wealth distribution, in
spite of federal constitutional precedent to the contrary. 1
These examples, while by no means exhaustive, illustrate
that it is becoming increasingly common 2 for state courts to rely
on their own constitutions to expand protection for individual
rights beyond the level provided by the federal Constitution and
courts.
IV. How TO APPROACH THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Once a lawyer or judge decides to engage in independent
67. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (relying on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1); Doe v. Maher, 8 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2006 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin.,
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) (relying on MASS. CONST. pt. 1, arts. I, X,
XII; pt. 2, ch.1, arts. 1-3).
68. Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1982) (relying
on COLO. CONST. art. V, § 33); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982)
(relying on N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1); Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of
Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983) (relying on Os. CONST. art. I, §
20).
69. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973).
70. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 510, 585 P.2d 71,
91 (1978) (relying on WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557
P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (relying on CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7; art. IV, § 16; art. IX, §§ 1, 5; art. XVI, § 8); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859 (W.Va. 1979) (relying on W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1).
71. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)
(relying on WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (relying on CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; art. IV, § 16; art. IX, §§ 1, 5; art. XVI, § 8). Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977)
(relying on CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 20; art. VIII, § 1); Washakie County School Dist. 1
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980) (relying on Wyo.
CONST. art. I, § 34; art. VII, §§ 1-12, 14, 15; art. XV, §§ 5, 15, 17).
72. To keep abreast of the latest developments in state constitutional law, see the
periodic columns on this issue by Professor Ronald Collins in the National Law Journal.
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interpretation of the Washington Constitution, he or she enters
a largely uncharted area. Since one of the purposes of indepen-
dent interpretation is to allow Washington courts to examine
their own state's historical mandate, lawyers and judges should
avoid the easy and well-worn path of searching for answers in
federal cases.
In fact, Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court and
several other commentators have urged state courts to consider
state declarations of rights before turning to the United States
Bill of Rights and the federal cases construing it.7" Under this
approach, if a state court rules as a matter of state law that a
right has been violated and must be redressed, it becomes
unnecessary to reach the federal constitutional question. This is
consistent not only with the dignity and independence of our
state courts and constitution, but also with the oft-stated "fun-
damental principle" that courts should not rule on constitu-
tional issues when a case can be resolved on lesser grounds.7 4
The basic purposes of the rule - to promote judicial economy,
respect for the authority of the lower law, and a concern for the
propriety of unnecessary judicial application of the highest law
to invalidate lower laws or governmental actions - all apply
equally well in the case of two constitutions, as in the case of a
constitution and a statute.
Applying the Washington Constitution first also serves the
equally important goal of preserving the power of the Washing-
ton courts as ultimate arbiters of the validity of state laws under
the state constitution. This is because a decision that a statute,
regulation, or governmental action is invalid under the state
constitution is not reviewable by the federal courts as long as
the state ground is independent of any federal ground and is
adequate to support the judgment. 75 In order to enjoy such
immunity from review and reversal by the United States
Supreme Court, however, the state court opinion must contain
an explicit statement that the decision is "alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds,"
73. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 18, at 380.
74. See, e.g., Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash. 2d 385, 391, 645
P.2d 697, 700 (1982); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 152, 641 P.2d
1180, 1182 (1982); State v. Hall, 95 Wash. 2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101, 103 (1981). See also
Linde, supra note 18, at 383.
75. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
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at least in cases in which federal law is also discussed. 0 Where
federal cases are cited, the opinion must clearly state that they
are considered for guidance only and do not compel the result.
7 7
Justice Linde's approach has been criticized. One critic has
described it as unrealistic and obsolete in light of the current
dominance of the United States Bill of Rights in constitutional
litigation, adding that to ignore well-established federal prece-
dent is inefficient and detracts from the legitimacy of state court
decisions. 78 The Linde approach, it is argued, could also dampen
the lively interaction between state and federal interpretations
of the Federal Bill of Rights, and thereby decrease the ability of
the United States Supreme Court to select from a wide variety
of innovative and well-considered interpretations of the federal
charter.
Whether raising or applying the state constitution before,
after, or simultaneously with the United States Constitution,
lawyers and judges should feel free to adopt modes of analysis
that differ from those employed by the United States Supreme
Court. Concepts such as "balancing" and "strict scrutiny" were
developed by the federal courts to deal with federal constitu-
tional questions. Entirely different approaches may be employed
in analyzing the Washington Constitution, either to improve
upon imperfect federal doctrines, to create a mode of analysis
more suitable to the Washington Constitution and courts, or to
avoid the danger that excessive use of federal language may lead
the federal courts to conclude that a decision based on state
grounds was in reality based in part on federal law and, there-
fore, reviewable by the federal courts. 9 While United States
Supreme Court decisions should be given the same weight and
respect as decisions of courts of sister states interpreting similar
provisions of their own constitutions, Washington attorneys and
courts should not feel compelled to adopt the terms and modes
of analysis used by the federal Court, or to explain why they
chose not to follow the federal rule in a case involving a similar
or even identical provision of our Declaration of Rights. No
76. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3476.
77. Id.
78. Note, supra note 30.
79. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983); South Dakota v. Nev-
ille, No. 81-1453, slip op. at 3 n.5 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,
670-71 (1982); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977).
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explanation is necessary.
In addition, one should be neither ignorant of nor intimi-
dated by the case law and doctrines that may be cited by parties
opposing independent interpretation. In most cases the
problems they present can and should be overcome. For exam-
ple, a number of Washington cases contain dicta, and sometimes
actual holdings, to the effect that provisions of our constitution
should be interpreted in exactly the same way that the federal
courts interpret the federal Constitution, unless a very good rea-
son for variance can be shown.80 While the Washington Supreme
Court's holdings must of course be followed unless overturned
by that court, it is clear from a number of more recent cases that
such an approach does not reflect the court's current attitude."'
Thus, older state supreme court pronouncements should be
scrutinized to determine whether they constitute actual holdings
and, if not, whether they were based on assumptions that are no
longer valid.
Another troublesome line of cases holds that statutes and
executive orders are presumed to be constitutional until a chal-
lenger proves them unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 1 This doctrine, which is founded on the separation of
powers and a presumption of the honorable intent of executive
and legislative officials who have also sworn to uphold the con-
stitution, makes it difficult to apply the Declaration at all, let
alone in an independent manner. It seriously hampers the
courts' accomplishment of what article 1, section 1 of the Wash-
ington Declaration defines as the fundamental purpose of our
state's constitution and government: to protect and maintain
individual rights. 3 The federal courts, and state courts faced
with questions of federal law, have solved this problem by
presuming that statutes involving fundamental rights or suspect
80. See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 738-39, 557 P.2d 321, 325
(1976), and cases cited therein.
81. See cases cited supra in note 4.
82. Sator v. State Dept. of Revenue, 89 Wash. 2d 338, 572 P.2d 1094 (1977); In re
Binding Declaratory Ruling of Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 87 Wash. 2d 686, 555 P.2d 1361
(1976); State v. Mather, 28 Wash. App. 700, 626 P.2d 44 (1981).
83. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. See also WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 30, 32. This purpose
extends to protecting minority rights against abridgment by the majoritarian branches of
government. See generally J. LOcKE, 2 TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ.
Press ed. 1960); U.S. v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); C. HAINES, 4
HARVARD STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE: THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 82-83
(1930).
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classifications are unconstitutional, 4  and the Washington
Supreme Court has taken a similar approach in at least one area
of significant state constitutional concern.8 5 Logic and a proper
concern for individual freedom strongly support the expansion
of this approach to all the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Washington Declaration.
Even in cases not involving fundamental rights or suspect
classifications, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of per-
suasion is too high. It reflects an excessive level of deference to
the legislative and executive branches, almost to the point of
placing their actions above the constitution.
Another problem with the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard is that it was originally applied to facts, not law.87 It was
designed to prevent innocent people from being convicted of
serious crimes. When applied to legal questions of constitutional
validity, however, this rigorous standard has no such noble goal.
Rather, it serves to undercut the fundamental rights of Wash-
ington citizens, and should therefore be discarded.8a
Precedents and doctrines like those discussed above should
be vigorously challenged whenever they threaten the effective-
ness of independent constitutional interpretation. Some are
changing rapidly, while others are more likely to change if law-
yers and judges actively scrutinize their public policy implica-
tions and their role in the emerging area of state constitutional
interpretation.
V. How TO ANALYZE THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Once a judge or lawyer has decided to apply Washington's
84. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (federal equal protection); Foun-
dation for the Handicapped v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 97 Wash. 2d 691,
648 P.2d 884 (1982) (federal equal protection); State v. Conifer Enters., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d
94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973) (federal freedom of speech and assembly).
85. Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 445 P.2d 602 (1968)
(holding that certain restraints on state constitutional free speech and press rights are
presumed unconstitutional).
86. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29, which states that "[t]he provisions of this Consti-
tution are mandatory."
87. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
88. For other arguments supporting a lower standard of persuasion in cases involv-
ing the constitutionality of statutes, and for an excellent article on this subject in gen-
eral, see Satter & Geballe, Litigation Under the Connecticut Constitution-Developing
a Sound Jurisprudence, 15 CONN. L. REv. 57 (1982).
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Declaration of Rights and to analyze it from a fresh and totally
independent perspective, he or she must decide what the words
mean. As noted earlier, the Washington Supreme Court has
decided only a handful of recent cases on independent state
grounds, so most of the problems faced will not be subject to
resolution by reference to any authoritative precedent. The ana-
lyst must therefore resort to essentially the same techniques as
when construing statutes. A brief discussion of those techniques,
applicable to all states but with emphasis on their specific appli-
cation to the Washington Declaration of Rights, follows.
A. Textual analysis
Most lawyers and judges are familiar with the general max-
ims of textual analysis as they apply to both statutory and con-
stitutional construction. It is undisputed, for example, that "if a
constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous on its face,
then no construction or interpretation is necessary or permissi-
ble."89 In determining whether a constitutional provision is plain
and unambiguous, and in interpreting it when it is not, the
words used must be given their common and ordinary mean-
ing.90 Of course, since the common and ordinary meaning of a
given word may have changed over the last century, the judge
must also inquire about the accepted meaning of the words at
the time the provision was adopted, and this information must
often be sought from extrinsic sources.91 This is especially true
of legal terms, the meaning of which must often be sought in
court decisions.92 It is equally axiomatic that every statement in
the Washington Constitution must be interpreted in light of the
entire document, that all fundamental principles are of equal
dignity, and that none may be so construed as to nullify, sub-
stantially impair, or avoid giving effect to any other portion of
the constitution. Furthermore, the express mention of one
thing in a constitution implies the exclusion of things not
89. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wash. 2d 189, 191, 543 P.2d 229, 230 (1975).
90. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Slavin, 75 Wash. 2d 554, 557, 452 P.2d 943, 945 (1969).
91. State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 139, 154 P.2d 826, 835 (1945), overturned on
other grounds, State v. Matuszewski, 30 Wash. App. 714, 637 P.2d 994 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 714-15, 530 P.2d
178, 195 (1974), overturned on other grounds, Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90
Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, 10 Wash. 2d 372, 382,
116 P.2d 756, 761 (1941), overturned on other grounds, Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs,
55 Wash. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 1085 (1959).
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mentioned.9
There are a few differences between statutory and constitu-
tional textual construction, however. For instance, a constitution
is an expression of the people's will and depends for its validity
on their ratification.9 5 Thus, the "common and ordinary mean-
ing" in which the constitution's words must be construed is the
meaning they would have had to the vast majority of ordinary
voters, rather than to a group of highly educated lawyers and
legislators, as may sometimes be considered when construing
statutes. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied
this rule in deciding that the state's payment of a workers' com-
pensation claim did not constitute an "appropriation of public
or trust money" subject to certain legislative procedures man-
dated by the Wisconsin Constitution. 6 The court stated that the
rule of constitutional construction, where the document was sub-
mitted to the voters for adoption, is to determine what the
words must have meant to the "general run of voters to whom
they were submitted. 9 7 The court held that the voters probably
understood "trust money" to mean public trust money in which
the people of the state had some interest, rather than private
money held in trust for third parties, even though such private
trusts existed at the time the constitution was ratified and were
probably well known to lawyers and educated people.98
Also, the Washington Constitution is not the highest law,
and each of its provisions must therefore be construed consist-
ently not only with all of its other provisions, but also with the
provisions of the United States Constitution, the federal laws in
effect at the time, and the Enabling Act which paved the way for
the state Constitutional Convention. This means in part that the
Washington Constitution cannot affirmatively impair rights pro-
tected by the United States Constitution. It also means that
since federal law is superior to state constitutional law, the Ena-
bling Act which authorized the creation of the Washington Con-
stitution set limits on what the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention could have expected to do. For instance, section four
of the Enabling Act provided, in pertinent part, "[tihat perfect
94. Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 295, 347 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1959).
95. See State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 233
(1964); B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327 (1925).
96. O'Brien, 186 Wis. at 16, 202 N.W. at 326.
97. Id. at 19, 202 N.W. at 327.
98. Id. at 21, 202 N.W. at 328.
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toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and that no
inhabitant of [Washington] shall ever be molested in person or
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship." 99
More specifically, the Enabling Act commanded "[tihat provi-
sion shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of
systems of public schools, which shall be open to all children of
[Washington], and free from sectarian control." 100 No portion of
the Washington Constitution should be construed in a way
inconsistent with such congressional mandates to the Constitu-
tional Convention.
Generally, however, textual analysis of constitutional law is
not significantly different than it is for statutory law.
B. Intent of the People
Our constitution begins: "We the people of the State of
Washington. . . do ordain this constitution."101 One commenta-
tor has observed that "the object of construction, as applied to a
written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people
adopting it.1102 The Washington Supreme Court has itself
stated that "the constitution is the expression of the people's
will, adopted by them."103 Therefore, the intent to be deter-
mined is that of the people who ratified the document rather
than the intent of the handful of men who wrote it.104 Of course,
in many cases the intent of the drafters is the only evidence we
have of the people's intent, but there may be cases where even
the expressed intent of the man who wrote a given provision
should be disregarded, if it can be shown that the voters had a
different understanding. The practical effect of this marked dif-
ference between statutory and constitutional construction is
likely to be small, however.
It should also be noted that "intent" refers not only to the
intent of the people in adopting specific provisions, but also to
the general intent and philosophy that underlie the entire con-
99. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, reprinted in 0 WASH. REV. CODE,
at 19 (1983).
100. Id.
101. WASH. CONST. preamble.
102. Sundquist, supra note 2, at 536 (quoting from T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIM-
ITATIONS 97 (8th ed. 1927)) (emphasis in original). See also B.F. Sturtevant Co. v.
O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 202 N.W. 324 (1925).
103. State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 233
(1964).
104. See Sundquist, supra note 2, at 536.
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stitution.115 When the voters approved the provisions that state
that "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essen-
tial to the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free
government,"106 and "the enumeration in this Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by
the people,' 10 7 they must have had far more in mind than was
contained within the four corners of the constitution itself. It
was undoubtedly part of the people's intent to create a system of
government and guaranteed individual rights that conformed
with all the then-current principles of democracy, representative
government, state sovereignty, and fundamental human rights.
This general intent should be considered and honored whenever
a party urges a construction of the constitution that appears to
violate any of these basic principles, whether expressly stated in
the constitution or not.
But how can a judge actually determine the "intent of the
people"? A number of factors, including the records of the Con-
stitutional Convention, the text and judicial construction of con-
stitutions from which various Washington provisions were
drawn, the history and political climate of frontier Washington,
and the early constructions of the provision under review, all
deserve consideration.
First, the judge should look to the Enabling Act, which
authorized the Constitutional Convention's work, and the min-
utes of the convention itself. 0 8 Unfortunately, however, "Wash-
ington is one of the few states in the Union which has not made
available in published form the [full] proceedings of its constitu-
tional convention."10 9 The minutes set forth in the Journal of
the Washington State Constitutional Convention, while enor-
mously helpful, do not include the actual verbatim debates. To
compensate partially for this regrettable omission, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court has used newspaper reports to fill in some of
the gaps in the official minutes.110 Fortunately, quite a number
105. Id. at 556-62.
106. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
107. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 30.
108. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889 (B.
Rosenow ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as JOURNAL).
109. Id. at vii.
110. Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 293, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959). In this case,
the court looked to newspaper reports of the convention debates to determine that the
framers intended the powers of the state auditor to be subject to change and diminution
by the legislature.
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of newspapers sent correspondents to cover the Constitutional
Convention,"' and some of those newspapers printed verbatim
reports of the debates on a number of crucial provisions. Simi-
larly, newspaper articles and columns that shortly preceded the
ratification vote may be of some help in determining how the
people perceived, or were told to perceive, the document on
which they were voting.1 2 Some of the delegates to the Consti-
tutional Convention also wrote articles about the constitution
that may help illustrate how they perceived certain provisions." 3
Substantial insight can also be gained from the constitu-
tions which the delegates copied from or referred to in drafting
the Washington Constitution. It is well known that the delegates
111. The following newspapers, among others, contain reports on the Constitutional
Convention, which met in Olympia from July 4 to August 22, 1889. Asterisked titles













*Puget Sound Weekly Argus (Port Townsend)
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
*Seattle Times






Walla Walla Weekly Statesman
Walla Walla Weekly Union
*Washington Standard (Olympia)
*Yakima Herald
2 B. Rosenow, Working Papers for the Journal of the Washington State Constitutional
Convention, 1889 ("Contemporary Newspaper Articles").
112. Cf. State ex rel. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 127-28, 182
P.2d 706, 714 (1947).
113. See, e.g., Kinnear, Notes on the Constitutional Convention, 4 WASH. HIST. Q.
276 (1913); Stiles, The Constitution of the State of Washington and its Effect Upon
Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIsT. Q. 281 (1913). See also Knapp, The Origin of the Consti-
tution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HisT. Q. 227 (1913) (containing information
obtained from surviving delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
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to the Washington Convention borrowed heavily from the con-
stitutions of other states. " " The Washington Declaration of
Rights, for example, was largely based on W. Lair Hill's pro-
posed constitution" 5 and its model, the Oregon Constitution.1 6
The Oregon Constitution in turn borrowed heavily from the
Indiana Constitution. 1 7 The Washington delegates also appro-
priated portions of the United States and California Constitu-
tions.118  The 1878 Washington Constitution," 9 which was
adopted by the people of the Territory in an abortive bid for
early statehood, also had an impact because it still had influen-
tial backing at the time of the 1889 Convention.'20 In addition,
Francis Henry, one of the members of the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee that drafted the 1889 Declaration, had also been a mem-
ber of the 1878 Convention's Bill of Rights Committee. 2'
Besides the pre-1889 case law interpreting these constitutions,
guidance may be found in the transcripts of the constitutional
conventions of the relevant states. Even where a constitutional
provision has independent roots, it is not unusual for state
courts to follow the reasoning of a court of a sister state in inter-
preting a closely similar provision of its own constitution. 2
It should be repeated, however, that even where the Wash-
ington Constitution contains language identical to a provision of
the United States or some other state constitution, it is quite
possible that the intent of the framers was different from that of
114. See, e.g., JoURNAL, supra note 108, at v; A. BEARDSLEY, supra note 19, at iv.
115. See Hill, Washington: A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State, The
[Portland] Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 9 (typed edition available in the Wash-
ington Room of the Washington State Library, Olympia).
116. A. BEARDsLEY, supra note 19, at v.
117. Id.
118. Id. at v-x.
119. For a complete text, see WASHINGTON'S FmST CONsTrrUTION, 1878, AND PRo-
CMDINGS OF THE CONVE ION (E. Meany & J. Condon ed. 1919) (hereinafter cited as
WASHINGTON'S FRST CONSTIUION).
120. See W. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of Washington
Territory, at 439 n.1 (1945) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis available in Washington State
Library, Olympia).
121. See WASHINGTON'S FIRST CONSTrruTION, supra note 104, at 10; B. Parkany,
"Religious Instruction" in the Washington Constitution 4 (Aug. 18, 1965) (unpublished
thesis available in the Washington Room of the Washington State Library, Olympia).
122. See, e.g., Biggs v. Department of Retirement, 28 Wash. App. 257, 259, 622 P.2d
1301, 1303, review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1019 (1981). In Biggs, the court of appeals looked
to a similar provision of the Indiana Constitution to decide that the Governor's appoint-
ment of the Director of the Department of Ecology was not an "appointment vested in
the legislature" within the meaning of art. III, § 13 of the Washington Constitution, even
though Senate confirmation was necessary.
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the framers of the other constitution. Consequently, no interpre-
tation of such constitutional provisions by the courts of other
states or the federal judiciary is binding on the Washington
courts. Very few provisions of the Washington Declaration con-
tain precisely the same language as the corresponding provisions
of the federal constitution. Some of the most important state
provisions are worded almost totally differently from the federal
provisions, including the sections that guarantee the freedoms of
speech and press, 2 8 freedom of religion, 24 right to privacy
(search and seizure)," 2 right to bear arms, 26 and equal protec-
tion.127 Even the provisions that appear to be generally similar
often contain subtle but crucial differences in language. For
instance, the Washington Constitution protects its citizens from
any "cruel" punishments, while the United States Constitution
apparently prohibits only punishments that are both "cruel and
unusual."'28 Similarly, the Washington Constitution protects
Washingtonians from being compelled to give "evidence" against
themselves, while the United States Constitution only forbids
compelling a citizen to be a "witness" against himself. 29 It is
reasonable to assume that the men who drafted the Washington
Constitution, many of whom were lawyers, 30 were well aware of
these linguistic differences and their likely effect on the future
legal interpretation of their work, and that they therefore
intended to create such differences. Ordinary rules of textual
and constitutional interpretation,'' as well as the logic of feder-
alism,8 2 require that meaning be given to the differences in lan-
guage between the Washington and United States Constitutions,
and that even identically worded provisions be interpreted inde-
pendently s unless a very good historical justification for assum-
123. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
124. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
125. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
126. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II with WASH. CoNSr. art. I, § 24.
127. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
128. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII with WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
129. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. V with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
130. Twenty-seven of the seventy-five delegates were lawyers or had studied law,
including three of the seven members of the Preamble and Bill of Rights Committee. See
the biographies of the delegates contained in JouRNAL, supra note 108, at 465-90; B.
Parkany, supra note 121, at 3.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 89-100.
132. See Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 237-38,
635 P.2d 108, 112-13 (1981).
133. See Young v. Konz, 91 Wash. 2d 532, 539, 588 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1979) (holding
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ing that the framers intended an identical meaning can be
found.
The Washington Supreme Court has also stated that "in
determining the meaning of a [state] constitutional provision,
the intent of the framers, and the history of events and proceed-
ings contemporaneous with its adoption may properly be consid-
ered."13 4 Similarly, "[ilt is a rule of statutory, as well as constitu-
tional construction that the antecedent mischief may be
considered, also the history and circumstances of the legislative
enactment."135
A few examples illustrate how history can shed light on spe-
cific evils the Declaration may have been intended to correct, as
well as the political philosophy behind its adoption, and thus on
how certain provisions should be interpreted.
Portions of Washington Territory suffered two periods of
martial law, one during an Indian uprising and one prompted by
anti-Chinese riots some thirty years later.15 The Governor made
the first declaration of martial law in 1856 solely to suspend the
right of habeas corpus for a handful of suspected Indian sympa-
thizers illegally held by the military.1 3 7 No military justification
for martial law existed, since the Indians had already been
defeated in the affected counties before the decree went into
effect. The imposition of martial law resulted in some egregious
violations of individual rights, as well as several violent confron-
tations between judicial and executive authorities. The Terri-
tory's Chief Justice sent a posse to the Executive Office to arrest
the Governor (they were ejected by a group of loyal soldiers and
clerks), and the Governor retaliated by arresting the Chief Jus-
that federal precedent regarding due process was not controlling with regard to state due
process, even though the state and federal due process clauses were identically worded).
134. Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 291, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959). See also
State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 146, 247 P.2d 787, 795
(1952) ("[c]ontemporary facts and circumstances unquestionably should and must be
accorded great weight and serious consideration" in state constitutional interpretation);
Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, 10 Wash. 2d 372, 382, 116 P.2d 756, 761 (1941), over-
turned on other grounds, Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 1085
(1959) ("[t]he history of the times and the circumstances under which the provision was
adopted may be considered in the [state constitutional] construction").
135. State ex rel. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 127, 182 P.2d
706, 714 (1947); see also Bowen v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d 148, 150, 127
P.2d 682, 684 (1942) ("one of the basic factors in the interpretation of a constitution is
the historical background which provoked its various provisions").
136. W. Airey, supra note 120, at 319-386.
137. Id. at 322.
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tice and holding him at a local fort for approximately two
weeks.' 3 8 Thereafter, judges who dared to hold court were forced
to assemble scores of bailiffs to protect them against the Gover-
nor's troops.139
The second declaration of martial law occurred just three
years before the 1889 Constitutional Convention. The official
purpose of the declaration was to restore order and to protect
the rights of whole communities of Chinese laborers who were
being forcibly expelled from Washington by lawless bands
headed, in the largest such incident, by Seattle's police chief.4
It should be noted, however, that at least one of the men who
urged the Governor to declare martial law hoped merely to sus-
pend the right of the civil authorities to arrest and try five
soldiers accused of gunning down several members of an anti-
Chinese mob.'" Whatever the cause of martial law, Seattle resi-
dents experienced approximately two weeks of military control
of civil government, characterized by curfews, military passes,
court-martials, and military edicts banishing citizens from their
homes. 4,2
One of the clearest examples of an "antecedent mischief"
that the constitution was designed to correct is reflected in arti-
cle 1, section 24 of the Washington Constitution, which provides:
The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of
himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this
section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corpo-
rations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.
This limitation on the right to bear arms, which is otherwise
much broader than the collective right protected by the second
amendment to the United States Constitution, was in direct
response to the use of armed detectives to brutally repress labor
strikes in Washington mines. 43 A knowledge of the history of
those strikes and the means used to repress them would obvi-
ously be valuable in interpreting this rather vague limitation on
138. Id. at 330-31.
139. Id. at 335. For somewhat different versions of these events, see C. REINHART,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 70-73 (1930); D. JOHAN-
SEN & C. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 310-11
(1957).
140. See, e.g., W. Airey, supra note 120, at 362.
141. Id. at 373, 380.
142. Id. at 377.
143. See, e.g., JOURNAL, supra note 108, at 513; W. Airey, supra note 120, at 456.
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a fundamental right.
The general political climate of the time may also shed
some light on the intent of the people and their delegates.' The
decade preceding statehood was a time of considerable conflict
and growth for Washington Territory, and the turbulence of
those years gave the people and delegates an outlook on govern-
ment that may well have been unique in the history of state con-
stitution making.
The most significant development of the 1880's in Washing-
ton was undoubtedly the construction of an extensive network of
railroads, culminating in the completion of the northern branch
of the transcontinental railroad with a terminus in Tacoma. It
would be difficult to overestimate the social, economic, and
political consequences of the railroad expansion. Between 1880
and 1890 the population of the Territory grew from about 75,000
to almost 350,000,45 an increase of almost 500 percent. Almost
overnight, an area that had recently been a wild frontier under-
went rapid urbanization. 46 An economic boom of unprecedented
proportions accompanied the explosive population growth."
4
7
As might be expected, however, the boom of the 1880's was
accompanied by serious problems. Large segments of the popu-
lation developed bitter resentments toward the railroads and
other large corporations. The causes included both monopolistic
practices, such as price gouging of Washington farmers who had
no other means of getting their products to market, and political
abuses, such as extorting land and subsidies from the federal,
state, and local governments as a condition of building railroad
lines. Even more serious was the widespread belief that the cor-
porations controlled legislators and government officials through
bribes and other corrupt practices, which led to a general dis-
trust of representative government."14  Similarly, substantial
labor unrest and a xenophobic attitude toward foreign workers
all contributed to the political climate of the day."'
144. Bowen v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d 148, 151, 127 P.2d 682, 684
(1942).
145. J. TAYLOR, HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF WASHINGTON STATE 103 (1898).
146. See D. JOHANSEN & C. GATES, supra note 139, at 395.
147. Id. at 383-99.
148. For a description of some of the causes of agrarian discontent in late nine-
teenth-century Washington, see generally D. JOHANSEN & C. GATES, supra note 139, at
414-29; M. AVERY, HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 195 (cor-
rected ed. 1962).
149. See M. AVERY, supra note 148, at 191-220.
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The general frustration and discontent of the populace
manifested itself in a number of ways. The most significant was
the development of a broad-based, if somewhat diffuse, reform-
ist or populist movement. Although the populists did not form
their own political party until shortly after statehood, their ideas
were already widespread by 1889.110 Many of the candidates for
delegate to the Constitutional Convention ran on populist plat-
forms, and those who were elected managed to include a number
of populist provisions in the constitution.'5 '
Among the tenets of populist philosophy were a strong dis-
trust of corruptible legislatures and the corporations that were
believed to corrupt them, and a corresponding preference for
more direct forms of democracy. The populists wished to protect
personal, political, and economic rights from both the govern-
ment and corporations, and they strove to place strict limita-
tions on the powers of both. To these ends the populists advo-
cated such reforms as a graduated income tax, mandatory
government ownership of railroads and communications facili-
ties, the replacement of the political patronage system with a
professional civil service, the establishment and protection of
unions, the prohibition of state officials from accepting free
passes from the railroads, and the exemption of a certain portion
of each person's property from seizure for the payment of
debts. ' Some of these and other populist proposals found their
way into the constitution. 153 For example, many constitutional
provisions that bear the mark of populist thinking are found
throughout article 12 of the constitution, which deals with pri-
vate corporations. A general understanding of the populist
movement would be very helpful in interpreting some of these
provisions.
There were, of course, fierce political debates in the 1880's
that were only peripherally related to the populist movement.
For example, women's suffrage and prohibition were hotly con-
tested issues of individual rights that were brought forcefully to
the attention of the delegates throughout the Convention.'" In
addition, the period was characterized by a strong sectional split
150. See J. Fitts, The Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889, at 8-10 (1951)
(Master's Thesis); M. AVERY, supra note 148, at 200.
151. See J. Fitts, supra note 150, at 8-10; M. AVRY, supra note 148, at 200.
152. See M. AvRY, supra note 148, at 199-200.
153. See JOURNAL, supra note 108, at vi.
154. W. Airey, supra note 120, at 469.
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between Eastern Washingtonians and those from the Puget
Sound region that often overshadowed party differences.15'
Still another potentially fruitful area of inquiry would be to
explore the judicial system and procedures known to the lawyers
who constituted the largest single occupational group on the Bill
of Rights Committee and in the Convention as a whole. 156 The
rough, informal, and sometimes anarchic nature of territorial
justice"57 may well have influenced the constitutional provisions
on judicial procedure and rights. For example, in territorial days
the trial judge who decided a case also sat on the appellate court
that reviewed his decision, since the Territorial Supreme Court
consisted of the territory's three trial judges."58 Similarly, the
pool of potential jurors in some counties was so small that some
of the grand jurors who indicted a defendant sometimes had to
serve on the petit jury that heard his case."' In at least one
instance a grand juror had to be specially excused from service
long enough for his fellow grand jurors to indict him.6 0 Court-
ordered executions were sometimes thwarted by the plots of
nonjudicial officials,"6 ' while others were carried out prematurely
by lynch mobs.6 2 On a more general level, a useful knowledge of
constitutional and judicial theory as an 1889 lawyer might have
understood it can be gleaned from the legal treatises and text-
books of the era. 6 '
Determining the impact on the Declaration of Rights of any
particular historical event or problem is beyond the scope of this
article. Some of them may have had no impact, while many
other historical and political factors undoubtedly influenced the
document. The point is merely that the history and political cli-
mate of the times can provide valuable clues to the intent
behind many of the broad provisions of the Declaration of
155. Id. at 446-49.
156. C. BARTON, BARTON'S LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, 1889-1890, at 169 (1890).
157. See generally W. Airey, supra note 120, at 268-318; Beardsley & McDonald,
The Courts and Early Bar of Washington Territory, 17 WASH. L. REv. & ST. BAR J. 57
(1942); J. SWAN, THE NORTHWEST COAST, OR THREE YEARS' RESIDENCE IN WASHINGTON
TERRITORY 292-306 (Wash. Paperback ed. 1972) (1st ed. New York 1857).
158. W. Airey, supra note 120, at 276; Beardsley & McDonald, supra note 156, at
79.
159. J. SWAN, supra note 157, at 295, 300.
160. Beardsley & McDonald, supra note 157, at 72.
161. W. Airey, supra note 120, at 285.
162. Beardsley & McDonald, supra note 157, at 71.
163. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (5th ed. 1883).
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Rights, both by illustrating the evils they were intended to cor-
rect and by revealing the political and philosophical orientation
of the people. An example of this type of analysis is found in
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School District No. 8, in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court referred to the history of
religious persecution in the countries from which many Wiscon-
sin settlers came, and the need to attract new immigrants from
such countries, in deciding that the Wisconsin Constitution pro-
hibited the reading of the King James version of the Bible in
public schools. 164
Finally, the early legislative construction of a provision
should be given great weight, especially if it extended over a
long period of time.16 5 Similarly, early constructions by the
courts and executive branch are relevant to the intent of various
constitutional provisions. Of course, such constructions are more
helpful the sooner they occurred after the adoption of the con-
stitution; constructions that occurred after the United States
Bill of Rights was applied to the states would be somewhat sus-
pect both because of the length of time that had elapsed since
the adoption of the Washington charter and because of the diffi-
culty of telling how much a reading of the United States Consti-
tution influenced the interpretation of the corresponding Wash-
ington provision.
C. Current values
Sometimes the text of the constitution is so ambiguous or
unclear, and the intent of the people is so obscure or so inappro-
priate in light of modern conditions and values, that one is left
with little practical objective guidance in interpreting a specific
provision. In State v. Brunn,161 for example, the Washington
Supreme Court considered the Declaration's provision on double
jeopardy in the following terms:
Candidly speaking, it is most unlikely that those who drafted
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, greatly con-
cerned themselves with the constitutional provision under dis-
164. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 197-98,
203, 44 N.W. 967, 974-77 (1890).
165. See, e.g., Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 727,
520 P.2d 178, 201; State ex rel. Todd v. Yelle, 7 Wash. 2d 443, 456, 110 P.2d 162, 169
(1941). See generally Sundquist, supra note 2, at 551-56.
166. 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945).
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cussion, or had any clear or fixed idea of its technical meaning.
It is more likely that the provision was inserted in Article 1,
entitled "Bill of Rights," [sic] because it was in the Federal bill
of rights and had been included in the constitutions of practi-
cally all of the states that had theretofore entered the Union.
67
In addition, some concepts held by the drafters of the Con-
stitution, reflected in its provisions, may no longer be acceptable
to our society, and may therefore be unenforceable. As one com-
mentator stated, "few persons would commit the Court to fol-
lowing the framers' views of all social issues-should we, for
example, follow the framers' views of indentured servi-
tude. . .?,,168 Various Washington cases have recognized that
constitutional "law is not a static concept and it expands to
meet the changing conditions of modern life."' 9 In State ex rel.
Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends,'170 for example, Washington's
highest court quoted with approval the following passage:
"Constitutions are designed to endure through the years,
and constitutional provisions should be interpreted to meet
and cover changing conditions of social and economic life....
"'Although the meaning or principles of a constitution
remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a
constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a
great length of time, and it is progressive and not static.
Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal an
interpretation, but rather the meaning given it should be
applied in such a manner as to meet new or changed conditions
as they arise.' ,,7
The Washington Constitution, then, is "organic not only in
the sense of being the fundamental law, but as a living thing
designed to meet the needs of a progressive society.'
'1 72
Many judges are understandably reluctant to refer to their
understanding of current social values and needs in construing a
167. Id. at 139, 154 P.2d at 835.
168. White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary
Debate and the "Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 165-66 (1979).
169. See, e.g., Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
238, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981).
170. 41 Wash. 2d 133, 247 P.2d 787 (1952).
171. Id. at 147, 247 P.2d at 795-96 (quoting State ex tel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20
Wash. 2d 138, 145, 146 P.2d 543, 547 (1944)).
172. State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 2d 138, 146, 146 P.2d 543, 547
(quoting Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 273 Ky.
674, 677, 117 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1938)).
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constitutional provision. One line of Washington cases, as well as
a sizeable subset of public and scholarly opinion, declare that
judges should not substitute their own views, or even those of
transient majorities, for those of the people who wrote the con-
stitution in 1889.173
One answer to this dilemma may be found in a recent arti-
cle by G. Edward White.17 4 White suggests that both history and
practical necessity require a certain amount of "judicial lawmak-
ing" in the constitutional realm, and that such lawmaking is not
really oppressive or undesirable. Under this view,
the art of judging, where constitutional issues are at stake, is
now linked not so much to a persuasive articulation of "first
principles" as to a persuasive articulation of deeply felt and
widely shared values. Legal principles, like the principles of
privacy and autonomy, are not now regarded as immutable, if
mystical axioms, but as manifestations of values currently
taken with great seriousness. 17
The primary defense against "bad judges" imposing their per-
sonal views on an unwilling majority, according to White, is the
fact that "[t]oo 'immoral' or too 'unjust' an interpretation of the
Constitution by the Court is simply not accepted by the public.
It is not, to use a term from the contemporary debate, invested
with legitimacy.' ' 176 White goes on to state that "[a] judgment
by segments of the public that it will not follow a Court's deci-
sion is the equivalent of a judgment by segments of the public
that it will vote a legislator out of office. 17
A related and more subtle check on the "bad judge" is that
judges must give a written justification for their decisions that
conforms at least superficially with both popular notions of
173. For some Washington cases standing for the propositions that constitutions
should be construed consistently over time, that their meaning is fixed at the time of
adoption, and that changing values and social and economic conditions do not justify
new interpretations, see State ex rel. Munro v. Todd, 69 Wash. 2d 209, 214, 417 P.2d
955, 958 (1966); State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 110, 273 P.2d 464, 479
(1954); State ex rel. Banker v. Clausen, 142 Wash. 450, 454, 253 P. 805, 807 (1927) (quot-
ing 6 R.C.L. 49).
174. White, supra note 168. This article contains an excellent general discussion of
some of the justifications for and limits on judicial activism in constitutional interpreta-
tion. But see Downs, Judges, Law-making and the Constitution: A Response to Profes-
sor White, 63 JUDICATURE 444 (1980). Cf. White, Letter to the Editor, 63 JUDICATURE 485
(1980) (partial reply to Mr. Downs' criticisms).
175. White, supra note 168, at 171.
176. Id. at 172.
177. Id. at 173.
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morality and justice178 and current law. Furthermore, judges
know that their opinions in one case may come back to haunt or
even control them in future cases. White concludes that the
need to justify judicial decisions and the possibility of noncom-
pliance are sufficient checks. Subject to such limitations, courts
must be able to divine and articulate deeply felt and widely
shared values that are held by the public at large, as the United
States Supreme Court did in Brown v. Board of Education,
17 9
when they construe a living constitution.
Whatever the theoretical justifications for considering cur-
rent conditions and values, the Washington Supreme Court has
done so explicitly and implicitly on a number of occasions. For
example, in Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmen-
tal Council,180 the court considered the changing role of the
shopping center in modern society, as well as the emphasis cur-
rently placed on the values of free speech and initiative, in
deciding that shopping center owners must permit the gathering
of initiative signatures on their property.
Thus, Washington judges should feel free to consider cur-
rent values and conditions as one factor in interpreting our state
constitution. Such considerations should play a part even when
the text of the document and the intent of its drafters are clear.
Neither the voters of 1889 nor the Washington Supreme Court
of 1984 intended our twentieth century society to be rigidly and
permanently locked into nineteenth century conceptions of jus-
tice and individual liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington Declaration of Rights is the primary guar-
antor of the rights of Washingtonians. Therefore, Washington
judges have both a right and a duty to examine it first whenever
a state law, regulation, or action is alleged to violate the funda-
mental rights of a Washington citizen, and to interpret it in the
truly independent manner that history, logic, and the principles
of federalism require. Obviously, independent interpretation is
more difficult than simply resorting to the wealth of established
federal constitutional precedent and assuming that it also
178. See id. at 172.
179. 347 U.S. 483, supp. op., 349 U.S. 294 (1954) (holding unconstitutional "sepa-
rate but equal" racial segregation of public schools).
180. 96 Wash. 2d at 239-40, 244-46, 635 P.2d at 113-14, 116-17.
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applies to the Washington Constitution. In exchange for this
extra effort, however, we will be rewarded with a revitalized
state constitution supported by a growing body of independent
case law that will provide the people of Washington with the
high level of individual freedom mandated by the founders of
our state. Furthermore, the definition and protection of many of
our citizens' most fundamental rights would once again be
largely in the hands of Washingtonians, as originally intended,
and less subject to interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court, which is necessarily confined to the "least common
denominator" approach to fundamental human rights. These are
not only desirable goals, they represent a return to some of the
"fundamental principles" that the Washington Constitution
reminds us are essential to the security of individual rights and
the perpetuity of free government. 81
181. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
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